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Abstract
Recent work on adversarial learning has focused mainly on
neural networks and domains where they excel, such as com-
puter vision. The data in these domains is homogeneous,
whereas heterogeneous tabular data domains remain under-
explored despite their prevalence. Constructing an attack on
models with heterogeneous input spaces is challenging, as
they are governed by complex domain-specific validity rules
and comprised of nominal, ordinal, and numerical features.
We argue that machine learning models trained on hetero-
geneous tabular data are as susceptible to adversarial ma-
nipulations as those trained on continuous or homogeneous
data such as images. In this paper, we introduce an opti-
mization framework for identifying adversarial perturbations
in heterogeneous input spaces. We define distribution-aware
constraints for preserving the consistency of the adversarial
examples and incorporate them by embedding the heteroge-
neous input into a continuous latent space. Our approach fo-
cuses on an adversary who aims to craft valid perturbations
of minimal `0-norms and apply them in real life. We propose
a neural network-based implementation of our approach and
demonstrate its effectiveness using three datasets from dif-
ferent content domains. Our results suggest that despite the
several constraints heterogeneity imposes on the input space
of a machine learning model, the susceptibility to adversarial
examples remains unimpaired.
1 Introduction
The susceptibility of learning algorithms to adversarial in-
put manipulations has puzzled researchers in recent years,
leading to extensive research work. Early work on adver-
sarial attacks was demonstrated on homogeneous features
of data and learning tasks that were popular at the time,
such as the bag of words in spam filtering (Dalvi et al.
2004; Lowd and Meek 2005) and a similar representation
in malware detection (Biggio et al. 2013). As deep learn-
ing has become prevalent, the vast majority of papers pub-
lished in recent years have discussed attacks and defenses
in the context of neural networks. Naturally, these works
have largely focused on domains where deep learning ex-
cels, although the data remains mainly continuous or ho-
mogeneous. A significant amount of research effort was put
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into computer vision applications and related tasks, e.g., im-
age segmentation (Arnab, Miksik, and Torr 2018), face de-
tection (Sharif et al. 2016), and more specifically, image
classification (Szegedy et al. 2013; Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2014; Papernot et al. 2016; Kurakin, Goodfellow,
and Bengio 2016; Carlini and Wagner 2017; Su, Vargas,
and Sakurai 2019). Other domains include audio (Carlini
and Wagner 2018), and the exclusively discrete domains of
malware represented by binary vectors (Grosse et al. 2016;
Hu and Tan 2017) and the classification of sparsely encoded
text (Jia and Liang 2017; Ebrahimi et al. 2018).
In contrast, there has been little to no research on het-
erogeneous input spaces in the context of adversarial exam-
ples. The reasons for this range from the intricacy of the
diverse feature types in the data, to the relatively underex-
plored robustness of the tree-based models that are most
associated with such data (Shavitt and Segal 2018; Arik
and Pfister 2019; Popov, Morozov, and Babenko 2019), i.e.,
gradient boosted decision trees. Another possible explana-
tion is that the work on adversarial learning had a strong
shift in focus almost entirely to deep learning. As we have
noted, neural networks are more commonly used in conjunc-
tion with data taken from high-dimensional, homogeneous
and continuous distributions, such as those describing nat-
urally occurring images or audio signals. Numerical opti-
mization techniques, such as those used to train neural net-
works and craft adversarial examples, excel in these data do-
mains as they are primarily suitable for learning continuous
functions (Nielsen 2015). Conversely, tabular data is drawn
from low-dimensional, heterogeneous, and largely discrete
input domains. More specifically, tabular data has the fol-
lowing characteristics: (a) input often includes a combina-
tion of nominal, ordinal, and real-valued features, (b) differ-
ent value ranges are associated with different features, (c)
missing values are common, (d) some features are consid-
ered immutable in the context of an attack, and (e) complex
cross-feature interactions define valid and anomalous fea-
ture combinations. Examples for domains where the data is
normally heterogeneous include healthcare, real estate, and
financial applications.
In this paper, we study the process of crafting adversarial
examples and essentially attacking models trained on het-
erogeneous tabular data. There are several challenges that
are unique to this case, both from the perspective of the
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adversary and challenges that are associated with the opti-
mization procedure of finding adversarial perturbations that
must comply with the heterogeneity. In contrast to audio or
language processing applications that are considered digital,
machine learning tasks on heterogeneous data are usually re-
lated to real-life scenarios, and the features describe tangible
information, such as a person’s salary. Therefore, an adver-
sary in the heterogeneous case would seek to minimize the
`0 norm of his perturbations, rather than other norms (e.g.,
`1, `2, `∞) which are compromised by the vastly different
feature scales. Additionally, as in real life, some of the in-
formation cannot be changed and must be considered im-
mutable by the adversary (e.g., past financial transactions),
which necessitates maintaining the feasibility of the pertur-
bations. Optimization challenges arise as well, including the
need to preserve the consistency of the adversarial examples
in terms of feature correlation, and to maintain the various
types of features (e.g., integers, positives, real numbers).
Our approach for attacking models with heterogeneous in-
put spaces addresses each of the aforementioned challenges,
while being agnostic to the target learning algorithm and the
data domain. First, we formulate the mathematical modeling
of the validity of the data, in terms of its consistency (i.e.,
preserving feature correlation) and feasibility (i.e., keeping
immutable features intact). We aim to capture the complex-
ity of the heterogeneous input space by creating a surro-
gate model that will be used to generate the adversarial ex-
amples. A primary component of the surrogate is the data
transformation function, whose purpose is to embed the het-
erogeneous data into a continuous latent space and lead to
more consistent adversarial examples. This function encom-
passes the correlations between the features and thus allows
the backpropagation, and namely the gradients used in find-
ing adversarial examples, to assist in maintaining the con-
sistency. Using these tools and techniques, we define a gen-
eral optimization problem for finding valid adversarial ex-
amples of heterogeneous tabular data, with the ultimate goal
of applying them in real life. Finally, we propose a clear im-
plementation of our approach and its various components,
based on neural networks and methods from metric learn-
ing. We test our approach and implementation using three
datasets from different content domains and a variety of tar-
get learning algorithms. Our results suggest that machine
learning models in domains with heterogeneous input spaces
are just as prone to adversarial manipulations as models in
other extensively studied domains, and imply that further re-
search is required to understand the role played by data in the
context of adversarial susceptibility.
2 Background
Tree-based models achieve state-of-the-art performance
in learning tasks that involve heterogeneous tabular
data (Shavitt and Segal 2018; Popov, Morozov, and Babenko
2019; Arik and Pfister 2019). The robustness of such models
has been extensively researched, including attacks on deci-
sion stumps or trees (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow
2016; Andriushchenko and Hein 2019; Chen et al. 2019),
random forests (Kantchelian, Tygar, and Joseph 2016; Chen
et al. 2019), and gradient boosting machines (Cheng et al.
2019; Chen et al. 2019). Similarly to these works, prior
studies on traditional non-tree-based models were either too
specific to the domains they were demonstrated in (Dalvi
et al. 2004; Kołcz and Teo 2009; Biggio, Fumera, and Roli
2010) or tailored to a certain class of learning algorithms
(e.g., SVM or linear models in general) (Lowd and Meek
2005; Biggio, Nelson, and Laskov 2011). The most promi-
nent attack methods today target neural networks (Szegedy
et al. 2013; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Paper-
not et al. 2016; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016; Car-
lini and Wagner 2017). The vast majority of these attacks
relate to a more general technique based on the network’s
gradient or its approximation. However, in the case of nomi-
nal features which are common in tabular data, the derivative
with respect to such features (i.e., ∂L∂xi for a loss function L
and a nominal feature xi) cannot be correctly interpreted,
as it is arbitrary at best. As a result of this and other is-
sues, all previously mentioned research either lacks gener-
ality or could not be adapted out-of-the-box to applications
with heterogeneous input space. We aim to bridge this gap
by extending the renowned adversarial deep learning tools to
create a neural network-based implementation of our generic
approach.
Recently, there have been some attempts at manipulat-
ing neural networks trained on heterogeneous tabular data.
Sarkar et al. (2018) performed a number of attacks on a
credit score classifier and demonstrated vulnerabilities in fi-
nancial applications. However, the experiment only included
continuous features despite the heterogeneous data domain,
and the evaluation metrics are not well-suited to a real-life
adversary. Ballet et al. (2019) presented a real-life data-
oriented approach that could be adapted to domains other
than finance. It employs the means to (1) preserve the data
types, by clipping, and (2) reduce the perturbation’s percep-
tibility, by incorporating feature importance in the attack ob-
jective in an attempt to mimic the decision process of a do-
main expert. Their method and experiment did not appropri-
ately reflect the heterogeneity of the data, since categorical
features were treated as continuous, and nominal features
were discarded altogether. Moreover, the evaluation of the
perturbations was based on the `2 norm, which is misrep-
resentative given the significant variability in scales of the
features, and the feature importance (i.e., knowledge of a
domain expert) was improperly modeled by using the Pear-
son correlation with the target variable.
A primary goal of our work is to cover all aspects re-
lated to the feature space challenges of heterogeneous tab-
ular data. The following works integrate components related
to covariances or outliers with the intent of preserving fea-
ture correlations or feature types. An early work (Biggio
et al. 2013) in the adversarial learning domain takes the un-
derlying distribution of the data into account in their pro-
posed attack. Their method includes modeling the a priori
estimate (i.e., p(x | y) for a data point x and its label y) by
using a kernel density estimator as an additional component
in their attack objective. However, this method was not eval-
uated on heterogeneous input spaces and therefore lacks ad-
ditional related aspects that are essential. Ustun et al. (2019)
formulated an integer linear programming (ILP) problem to
find perturbations that do not include immutable features
and are consistent (i.e., preserving the data’s structure under
its various mathematical constraints) by adding constraints
to the problem definition. Kanamori et al. (2020) extended
this work by incorporating non-linear statistical elements
that correspond to the empirical distribution of the data,
in a mixed ILP-based optimization instance. Their method
aims to create realistic perturbations that conform with fea-
ture correlations and outlier values, by adding approxima-
tions of the Mahalanobis’ distance (Mahalanobis 1936) and
the local outlier factor (Breunig et al. 2000) to their objec-
tive function and optimization constraints. The context of
the two last-mentioned works is counterfactual explanation
methods (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell 2018) of ma-
chine learning models used to provide recourse to users who
wish to gain access to the factors underlying the model’s de-
cision (e.g., a credit scoring application where customers try
to improve their score). Contrarily, our work focuses on an
adversarial setting and related topics.
The approach we propose in this paper complements pre-
vious work by weaving the various concepts we discussed
so far into one exhaustive formulation and implementation,
and therefore the approach addresses all possible challenges
that arise from crafting adversarial examples for heteroge-
neous data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to introduce a comprehensive and general adversarial attack
method that is agnostic to the target learning algorithm and
focuses on truly heterogeneous tabular input space.
3 Our Approach
In this section, we describe our approach using the follow-
ing notations. The attacker targets a machine learning model
M : X → Y . For brevity, we assume X ⊆ Rd is a discrete
input space with d discrete random variables. In case of a
continuous random variable, every reference to the proba-
bility P(Xi = xi) is interchangeable with the value of the
density function fXi(xi), as our interest is in the likelihood
of a value xi (or close enough to it) to be sampled from
the respective distribution. The label space is denoted by
Y ⊆ {0, 1}m where labels are one-hot encoded.
Let X1, . . . , Xd be the random variables that represent
the features in the data, which have the discrete distribu-
tions F1, . . . ,Fd, such that for each, 1 ≤ i ≤ d, Xi ∼ Fi.
Therefore, an input vector X = (X1, . . . , Xd) follows the
multivariate joint distribution F , as in X ∼ F . We note that
X1, . . . , Xd are not necessarily independent or identically
distributed. It would be even safer to assume some level of
dependency between the features as naturally prevails in tab-
ular data. For a benign sample x ∈ X , let y ∈ Y be the true
label.
In our study, given x ∈ X , a distance metric D (e.g.,
`0, `1), and a maximum perturbation size λ, the attacker’s
objective is to find an adversarial example x∗ ∈ X , such
that x∗ = x + δ for a perturbation δ, M(x∗) 6= y, and
D(x, x∗) < λ. We assume that the attacker has access to the
training data X ⊆ X used for constructing M . Although our
approach introduces an untargeted attack, it can be easily
modified to fit a targeted attack.
3.1 Data validity
To ensure the validity of x∗, the attack algorithm must pre-
serve the distributional consistency of the various features of
the data and maintain the attack’s feasibility by preventing
changes to immutable features. These two challenges are of
vital importance and enable the attacker to eventually apply
the adversarial perturbations in practice (in the real world).
Data consistency. Changing a sample x with the corre-
sponding label y might result in values that are unlikely
given F , i.e., values that lie in unsupported regions of F . In
such a case, we refer to x∗ as inconsistent and therefore con-
sider it invalid. Formally, for a consistency threshold  > 0,
we consider a sample to be -inconsistent if the probability
PX∼F (X = x∗ | y) ≤ . Note that consistency is measured
in the context of a specific class label, so an input vector can
be highly likely given one label but be anomalous for an-
other. Two examples of inconsistency are described as fol-
lows. (1) A scenario in which x∗i ∈ x∗ where x∗i is an un-
defined outcome of X∗i or PXi∼Fi(Xi = x∗i | y) = 0; for
instance, Xi represents the number of children but x∗i /∈ N.
(2) For each x∗i ∈ x∗, we have PXi∼Fi(Xi = x∗i | y) > 0
but PX∼F (X = x∗ | y) ≤ ; consider Xi, Xj to be year of
birth and year of death respectively but x∗i > x
∗
j .
Consequently, we define x∗ as an -consistent adversarial
example if the following holds:
PX∼F (X = x∗ | y) >  (1)
Data feasibility. Data describing real-life use cases in-
volves features that represent somewhat tangible details. In
real-world applications, some of the information collected
is factual and immutable, meaning it cannot be changed by
an attacker. Although it is possible to digitally perturb im-
mutable features, they cannot be changed in real life and
any change to them would render the example infeasible and
therefore invalid. Examples for immutable features include
a patient’s blood type, a bank customer’s history of financial
transactions, and the size of a piece of real estate.
We define the subset of indexes of immutable features as
I ⊆ {1, . . . , d}, and require an adversarial example x∗ to
satisfy the following, in order to be feasible:
∀i ∈ I, x∗i = xi (2)
To conclude, an adversarial example x∗ must satisfy both
Equations 1 and 2 to be consistent and feasible. Therefore,
for a consistency threshold  and set of immutable features
I , the validity of an adversarial example x∗ is modeled as
the conjunction:
PX∼F (X = x∗ | y) >  ∧ ∀i ∈ I, x∗i = xi (3)
3.2 Data transformation
Unlike continuous data, categorical and nominal features
impair the performance of commonly used optimization
techniques, such as the training of neural networks (Nielsen
2015). As a result, many methods for crafting adversarial ex-
amples are limited when used in conjunction with heteroge-
neous tabular data. In addition, perturbing a non-continuous
feature without taking into account the support of its corre-
sponding distribution is highly likely to result in an illegal
value. This puts the attack method in jeopardy and may re-
sult in -inconsistent and illegal adversarial examples.
To address these challenges, we suggest using a structure-
preserving transformation function, which practically serves
as an embedding function. It is defined as fθ : X → Re
for a parameter set θ. This new representation provides two
advantages: (1) The process of constructing f induces the
learning of latent patterns of features that are otherwise less
adequately represented, i.e., categorical and nominal fea-
tures. Such patterns include interactions among features, se-
mantic meanings of nominal features, and more generally,
the modeling of the probability distribution of the data. The
parameters of f carry meaningful information and allow the
gradients of the network to encompass these patterns, which
in turn will assist the optimization process in finding consis-
tent adversarial examples. (2) The data is transformed into a
continuous and homogeneous space, making it easier to ma-
nipulate using optimization-based attacks and measure dis-
tances.
f can be implemented using various general concepts, in-
cluding generative adversarial networks (Goodfellow et al.
2014), autoencoders (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams
1985), and metric learning (Weinberger and Saul 2009).
3.3 Attack description
Recall that the attacker’s goal is to craft adversarial exam-
ples for a target model M . M could be based on any ma-
chine learning algorithm, however it is more likely that M
is tree-based, as this is the type that is most associated with
heterogeneous tabular data. The attack algorithm relies on
the transferability property (Papernot, McDaniel, and Good-
fellow 2016) of adversarial examples. The attacker crafts ad-
versarial examples for a surrogate model M˜ and uses them
against the target model M . The surrogate is created to sup-
port the requirements of the data transformation process and
to facilitate the generation of adversarial examples that com-
ply with the constraints set forth in Equation 3.
Constructing a surrogate model. A surrogate model
M˜ : X → Y is constructed by composing a classifier C
and an embedding function f , such that M˜ = C ◦ f . Func-
tion f transforms the data, and C : Re → Y solves the
original learning task. It is important to note that f and C
are trained separately and sequentially, with C training over
{f(x) | x ∈ X}. Similarly to the embedding function f , the
task solver can be implemented using multiple techniques.
However, such implementation should comply with require-
ments of the attack method.
Generating adversarial examples. Let x ∈ X be a valid
input sample, such that y ∈ Y is the true label of x. Given
a consistency threshold  > 0, a set of immutable features
I ⊆ {1, . . . , d}, a distance metricD, and a maximum pertur-
bation size λ, the attacker aims to find a valid adversarial ex-
ample x∗ ∈ X , such that M(x∗) ≈ M˜(x∗) 6= y. Due to the
design of M˜ and its components, which are differentiable by
our definition, the attacker can use any optimization-based
attack to craft adversarial examples and transfer them to the
target model. Formally, based on Equation 3, finding a valid
x∗ is done by solving the following optimization problem:
argmin
x∗
Ladv(M˜(x∗), y) + ‖f(x)− f(x∗)‖2
s.t. PX∼F (X = x∗ | y) > ,
∀i ∈ I, x∗i = xi,
D(x, x∗) < λ
(4)
where Ladv is defined as the adversarial objective function.
The attacker chooses Ladv according to his goals, capa-
bilities, and data domain. For example, Ladv can combine
the original task’s loss function (e.g., cross-entropy, mean
squared error) with additional domain specific objectives,
such as the real-life complexity in changing the values of
individual input features. The second component in the ob-
jective, defined as Lspatial = ‖f(x)− f(x∗)‖2, helps arrive
at a closer point in the latent space, which results in more
consistent adversarial examples by the construction of f .
The optimization problem in Equation 4 is not a simple
task, especially because of its validity constraints. Calculat-
ing P(X = x∗ | y) cannot be done trivially, but it can be
approximated by using CTGAN (Xu et al. 2019), which is
specific to heterogeneous tabular data; or other more gen-
eral approaches, such as Bayesian networks (Zhang et al.
2017) and decision trees (Reiter 2005). As  increases, the
adversarial example that is -consistent is more likely and
therefore more imperceptible in real life. However, there is
a clear trade-off between finding such an -consistent adver-
sarial example and its likelihood, as this optimization prob-
lem is highly non-convex, and its convergence is not guar-
anteed. The feasibility constraint can be forced by applying
a feature mask that prevents perturbations to immutable fea-
tures from being added.
These challenges require a more eased optimization in-
stance that approximates the original problem and can be
solved by using existing algorithms. We propose an imple-
mentation of such an optimization instance in our experi-
ments which are described in the next section where we
begin by describing the learning process of the surrogate
model, including the embedding function as outlined in 3.2,
and the task solver. Then we illustrate the complete course
of the adversarial attack algorithm, as well as the means em-
ployed to enforce the data validity rules.
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets
We conducted our empirical study on three tabular datasets
from different content domains. These datasets were chosen
because they all have the various challenging characteristics
of tabular data, and especially because they are heteroge-
neous and pertain to real-life oriented tasks.
• Home Credit Default Risk (HCDR) (Home Credit Group
2018) - includes current and historical financial informa-
tion on just over 300, 000 customers and their loan re-
quests. This dataset’s use case is a binary classification
task in the credit risk assessment area designed to predict
a client’s repayment abilities.
Dataset Integer Positive Negative Normalized Categorical Total Features
HCDR 11 11 5 15 21 52
ICU 42 104 0 1 21 126
Airbnb 20 22 1 5 133 157
Table 1: Number of constraints by type (features may have more than one constraint).
Decision Tree Random Forest GBM Surrogate
Dataset Metric Training Validation Training Validation Training Validation Training Validation
HCDR AUC 0.72 0.69 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.73
ICU AUC 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.88
Airbnb MSE 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.11
Table 2: Evaluation scores of the training and validation sets on the target and surrogate models for each task. The performance
is evaluated using the ROC-AUC metric for classification tasks and the mean squared error (MSE) for regression.
• Intensive Care Unit (ICU) (The Global Open Source
Severity of Illness Score Consortium, Global Women in
Data Science Conference February 2020) - contains med-
ical data on around 91, 000 patients in an intensive care
unit. This dataset is associated with a binary classification
task aimed at helping predict the death of ICU patients.
• U.S. Lodging Listings (Airbnb) (Inside Airbnb 2018) -
data scrapped from the Airbnb website on some 57, 000
property listings in major U.S. cities. This dataset’s use
case is a regression task aimed at predicting the price of
lodging.
In the binary classification tasks, both of the datasets
suffer from class imbalance with a ratio of approximately
92 : 8. The global minimum and maximum values in each
dataset can be extremely far apart, with the difference be-
tween them ranging from approximately 103 in Airbnb to
105 in ICU and 109 in HCDR. Missing values are quite com-
mon as well, with ICU having nearly a quarter of all of the
data missing, down to 15% in HCDR and 9% in Airbnb.
HCDR, ICU, and Airbnb include 22, 81, and 48 immutable
features, respectively. Table 1 lists the number of constraints
imposed on the features in each dataset by constraint type
and the total number of features.
As commonly done for these data domains, we applied
the following preprocessing steps on the datasets. First, the
data was cleaned of outliers and features for which over 75%
of the values were missing. In cases in which there was a
group of features with unusually high correlation of over
0.95 or under -0.95, we dropped all but one randomly cho-
sen feature from the group. Missing values in each of the
remaining features were imputed with one of the following:
the modal value for categorical variables, the mean value
for regular numeric variables, or a unique value outside the
variable’s legitimate value range. We chose the combination
of methods that yielded the best performance. Categorical
features were encoded with consecutive integers, so that all
of the data is numeric. Finally, all of the data was re-scaled
or standardized so that each feature is in the range [0, 1] or
normally distributed.
Note that our preprocessing maintains the challenging
characteristics of tabular datasets, and the attack method
backpropagates through the relevant operations. Each learn-
ing algorithm has its own capabilities, limitations, and im-
plementation; therefore, some of the algorithms do not re-
quire all of the above preprocessing. For example, the Light-
GBM algorithm (Ke et al. 2017) handles missing values
and categorical variables as per its implementation, so we
skipped the relevant preprocessing steps for that model.
4.2 Attack implementation
The following is an implementation of the various com-
ponents of our approach. It is important to note that other
choices can be made for any component and part of the pro-
cess as long as the general requirements are met, including
the data transformation and validity rules.
Models: Here we describe the target and surrogate models
used in the experiments. All of the datasets were split into
training and validation sets consisting of 80% and 20% of
the data, respectively. Another separate set of 500 samples
was used to craft the adversarial examples.
Target models. As previously noted, heterogeneous tabu-
lar data is more commonly associated with tree-based mod-
els, such as decision tree and random forest, as well as gra-
dient boosting machines like LightGBM. Due to their pop-
ularity, we demonstrate the transferability of our attack on
the surrogate model to these three learning algorithms. The
performance evaluation of the models for each dataset are
presented in Table 2.
Surrogate model. The surrogate model consists of an em-
bedding network and a task solver network. Motivated by
concepts from the person re-identification task, in each em-
bedding network we use batch hard triplet loss (Weinberger
and Saul 2009; Hermans, Beyer, and Leibe 2017) with the
cosine similarity distance metric. To fit the regression task
to the same embedding learning process used in classifica-
tion, we use equal frequency binning on the target variable.
We train the embedding networks with the Adagrad opti-
mizer (Duchi, Hazan, and Singer 2011), a learning rate of
Categorical Numeric Total
Dataset `0 `0 (%) `1 `0 `0 (%) `0 `0 (%) Success
HCDR 1.60 7.62% 6.71 0.67 2.16% 2.27 4.37% 98.20%
ICU 1.80 8.56% 4.96 1.64 1.56% 3.51 2.79% 94.40%
Airbnb 4.33 3.26% 4.25 0.95 3.96% 5.28 3.36% 99.80%
Table 3: Analysis of the adversarial attack on the surrogate model. The metrics correspond to the average across the perturba-
tions of successful adversarial examples. The `0 value is partitioned into categorical and numeric features. The `0 (%) column
relates to the corresponding part of the `0 from the relevant type of features. The success rate is relative to the attack set
consisting of 500 samples in each task.
0.001, and a mini-batch size of 32. In our experiments, the
size of the embedding vectors for HCDR, ICU, and Airbnb
is four, 20, and 15, respectively. Then, we freeze the embed-
ding network’s parameters and add the task solver sequen-
tially; it consists of a single layer with one neuron and a sig-
moid or softmax activation function. The solver receives the
embedding vectors from the trained embedding network as
input. We use the Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba 2014) to
minimize the standard objectives matching the learning task:
cross-entropy for classification and MSE for regression.
Attack overview: Our attack implementation, presented in
Algorithm 1, is a variant of the `0-oriented Jacobian saliency
map attack (Papernot et al. 2016). This iterative algorithm
performs the following main steps. First, it selects the fea-
ture that has the most impact on the prediction of the model,
excluding immutable features. To avoid having the algo-
rithm repetitively make changes that will be clipped at the
end of the iteration, features that have already been selected
are not reconsidered. The impact should be measured ac-
cording to the model that is being attacked; in the case of our
neural network-based surrogate model, it is the gradients, as
described in Algorithm 1, and for the tree-based target mod-
els it is the information gain of each feature. Second, a per-
turbation vector α for the selected features is calculated by
using the Adam optimizer which minimizes the adversarial
objective function, as in Equation 4. The auxiliary method
for this calculation is denoted by COMPUTESTEP. Lastly,
the PROJECT method is performed on x∗, projecting each
feature value onto its consistent set or continuous range, and
ensuring that for each feature i, PXi∼Fi(Xi = x∗i ) > 0
(though not ensuring that PX∼F (X = x∗) > 0). We set the
maximum perturbation size λ to be the number of mutable
features. The first part in the exit condition of the algorithm
is different for regression tasks: |M˜(x∗) − y| > τ , for a
predefined threshold τ . Given that the target variable in the
Airbnb use case is the logarithm of the property’s price and
considering its variance, we set τ = 0.75.
4.3 Results
The surrogate and target models are evaluated using the
standard metrics relevant to the task: the receiver operating
characteristic-area under the curve (ROC - AUC) for imbal-
anced classification and the MSE for regression. The per-
formance of the models presented in Table 2 shows that the
GBM model consistently outperforms every other model in
Algorithm 1: Crafting an adversarial example. M˜
is the surrogate model, x is the candidate benign
sample, y its label, L is the original task’s loss func-
tion, L∗ is the adversarial objective function com-
posed of Ladv and Lspatial, I is the set of immutable
features, and λ is the maximum distortion (`0-wise).
Input: M˜ , x, y, L, L∗, I , λ
1 x∗ ← x
2 S ← ∅
3 while M˜(x∗) = y and |S| < λ do
4 G← ∇x∗L(M˜(x∗), y)
5 S ← S ∪ {argmaxi/∈S∪I Gi}
6 α← COMPUTESTEP(x∗,L∗)
7 forall i ∈ S do
8 x∗i ← x∗i + αi
9 x∗ ← PROJECT(x∗)
10 return x∗
every use case and that its performance is also very close
to highly-ranked submissions in the corresponding Kaggle
competitions (apart from the Airbnb which is not part of a
Kaggle competition). It is important to note that our surro-
gate model does not fall too far behind the GBM model,
which means that the embedding sub-network did not affect
the overall performance too negatively.
As we have established, the metric most relevant to the
case of heterogeneous data and real-world use cases is the
`0 norm, as the other norms are compromised by the sig-
nificantly different scales of features. However, we also de-
cided to include the `1 norm in our analysis for just numeric
features in the perturbations, in order to obtain some un-
derstanding of how these features are perturbed in cases in
which there are unusually big changes. In addition to the `0
norm, we also looked at its percentage of the entire dataset’s
features, as the number of features varies between the use
cases. An example of the need to analyze the percentage can
be found in the Airbnb use case where the value of the av-
erage total `0 distance is 5.28, but when incorporating the
total number of features in the dataset, which is 157, we get
an average relative `0 (i.e., total `0(%)) of only 3.36%. In
Table 3 we can see that in every use case the bulk of the aver-
age perturbation, are changes in categorical features. More-
Dataset GBM Random Forest Decision Tree
HCDR 38.29% (44.26%) 35.85% (42.22%) 38.20% (47.50%)
ICU 27.00% (36.32%) 20.40% (36.32%) 23.60% (60.53%)
Airbnb 14.42% (29.78%) 18.83% (32.93%) 21.36% (31.50%)
Table 4: Ratios of successfully transferred adversarial examples that were generated in an attack on the surrogate model. The
parentheses indicate the transferability rates of attacks which were adjusted to each target model.
(a) HCDR (b) ICU (c) Airbnb
Figure 1: Number of adversarial examples by the total number of features changed (i.e., `0 distance).
over, since the Airbnb dataset contains considerably more
categorical, which are mostly binary features (representing
the existence of amenities in the property), the difference is
even more noticeable, with 4.33 of the total `0 distance of
5.28 being changes in categorical features. Figure 1 presents
histograms of the `0 norms of the perturbations, which are
highly right-skewed and indicate that the vast majority of
the adversarial examples include changes to only 1-2 fea-
tures. The success rate is consistently high throughout the
use cases, with nearly all of the samples in the attack set
becoming adversarial examples.
In addition to attacking the surrogate model, we exam-
ine the transferability of the adversarial examples to GBM,
random forest, and decision tree models. As described in
Algorithm 1, the iterative feature selection is based on the
gradients of the surrogate network. When targeting models
other than the surrogate, this selection process can be ad-
justed so that the impact of each feature is represented ex-
plicitly by the model, rather than implicitly by a surrogate’s
gradients. We changed it to be the feature importance of the
tree-based models we target, namely the information gain of
each feature. In Table 4 we report the transferability rates
of the adversarial examples for each of the target models,
as well as the rates of the adjusted attack (i.e., when feature
selection is based on the target model’s feature importance)
in parentheses. The base transferability rates in all use cases
and models is already high, however the adjustment made
evident and substantial improvements consistently through-
out our experiments.
In our experiments, the specific compositions of the vari-
ous datasets (i.e., the size of groups of feature types) and the
distribution of the constraints (as described in Table 1) have
a direct effect on the adversarial optimization process. Gen-
erally, we observed that heterogeneous input spaces involve
several constraints and pose many challenges to the adver-
sarial susceptibility of learning algorithms. Our results show
that not only is it possible to overcome such challenges and
attack neural networks trained on heterogeneous tabular data
very successfully and effectively, but that the transferability
property of the adversarial examples generated is rather per-
sistent in this unique case as well.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we explored the role played by data in the sus-
ceptibility of machine learning models to adversarial manip-
ulations. We introduced a general approach that formalizes
the generation of valid adversarial examples for heteroge-
neous tabular data, and provided an implementation of such
an attack in an optimization-based context. Our approach is
focused on an `0-oriented adversary and her ability to apply
the adversarial perturbations in real life. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study to present an automated at-
tack for heterogeneous tabular data. Our results support the
possibility of successfully attacking previously unexplored
domains with heterogeneous input space. Future work may
place greater emphasis on the important aspect of preserv-
ing feature correlation and improving our implementation,
as well as developing ways to properly evaluate the suc-
cess of such preservation. Advancement of mitigation meth-
ods could have more potential in the case of heterogeneous
data than in the general case, as the baseline naive approach
would be to limit the training to immutable features. We be-
lieve that our work has identified an important research di-
rection in the field of adversarial learning and broadens its
scope beyond the main applications of computer vision.
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